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the alternative credits. 10 4 So basic, however, are the deficiencies of the Act
as a means of curtailing war profiteering, marshalling funds for the federal
treasury, preserving competitive relationships, and maintaining the national
defense effort that sound discretion appears to demand a fundamental over-
hauling of its principles and the subsequent adoption of a new approach.
L. ROBERT DRIVER, JR. t
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING POWER UNDER THE
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT
UNDER Section 11(b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
19351 it is the duty of the Securities and Exchange Commission to require
holding companies and their subsidiaries to "take such steps as the Commis-
sion shall find necessary to ensure that the corporate structure or continued
existence of any company in the holding-company system does not unduly
or unnecessarily complicate the structure, or unfairly or inequitably distribute
voting power among security holders, of such holding-company system." 2
A definite criterion for simplification of corporate pyramids within utility
systems is set up by the clause prohibiting more than two holding companies
above an operating subsidiary.,3 A less specific standard for recapitalization
or reorganization within individual corporations is offered by the statute's
implication that the ideal structure includes but one class of bonds and one
class of voting stock.4 But aside from the statute's general statement of
policy against control "exerted through disproportionately small investment"
and the consequent emphasis on voting power in the election of directors
104. N. Y. Times, April 23, 1941, p. 16, col. 2.
t Second Year Class, Yale Law School.
1. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1939). See Comments (1936) 45
YAL.z L. J. 468, (1935) 30 ILL L. REv. 509, 648. The constitutionality o the registra-
tion provisions of the Act [§§ 4(a) and 5] is established. Electric Bond & Share Co. V.
Securities and Exchange Comm., 303 U. S. 419 (1938). Section 11 (b) (2) has been held
constitutional. In re Community Power & Light Co., 33 F. Supp. 901 (S. D. N. Y.
1940), (1941) 8 U. OF CHI. L. Rwv. 372.
2. Section 11(b) (1), the other component of the so-called "death sentence," orders
the Commission to create geographically integrated public utility systems. See Com-
ment (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1045.
3. This so-called "great-grandfather" clause has been declared not a limitation,
but a minimum criterion for simplification. United Light & Power Co., Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 2636, March 20, 1941, p. 12.
4. § 7(c) (1). See Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Manage-
ment under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1938) 52 HARV. L. REV.
216, 219.
5. §§I(b)(3) and 1(c).
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the Commission is provided with no guide toward a fair and equitable dis-
tribution of voting power.6
While the requirements for protective and equitable voting rights had been
formulated in theory before passage of the Holding Company Actj their
practical application to specific corporate structures had remained an academic
problem. Confronted with this problem and wary of setting precedents, the
Commission has invoked its power to redistribute as a threat to induce volun-
tary compliance, but has postponed affirmative action under Section 11(b)
(2).s In the exercise of other broad powers, however, it has been forced to
consider voting rights. Under Section 7(e) no company may "alter the
priorities, preferences, voting power, or other rights of the holders of an
outstanding security" if the Commission finds that the change will "result
in an unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power." Where corpora-
tions have voluntarily enfranchised previously voteless preferred stockholders,
the Commission has promptly found that the consequent dilution of common
stock rights does not result in an inequitable distribution.0 Where the dis-
tribution is already unfair to senior interests, however, and the contemplated
action might increase the inequity, the application of Section 7(e) has been
doubtful. The problem has arisen where proposed reductions in capital would
give common-controlled directors renewed power to declare dividends with-
out the consent of unprotected preferred stockholders. Reluctant to concede
that an exaggeration of an existing inequitable distribution is not within the
prohibition of Section 7(e), the Commission has sidestepped a decision of
the question by reserving control of subsequent action and conditioning its
approval on a favorable class vote of the preferred stockholders. 0 In all cases,
moreover, it has emphasized its reservation of full authority to act under
Section 11(b) (2).
Over the voting rights of new issues, the Commission has maintained an
increasingly vigilant supervision. The Act imposes a "heavy presumption"
against issuing any but common stock having at least equal voting rights
6. For the questions left unanswered by similar criteria in the Chandler Act, see
Krotinger, Management and Allocation of Voling Po-wer in Corporate Reorqanizations
(1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 646, 649, n. 17.
7. See especially Stevens, Stockholders' V'oting Rights and the Centralization of
Voting Control (1926) 40 Q. J. EcoN. 353. For recent treatment of the problem, see
Stevens, Voting Rights of Capital Stock and Shareholders (1938) 11 J. Bus. oF U. or
CHi. 311; Comment (1939) 52 HnRv. L. Rzy. 1331.
S. Section 11(b) itself demands action only "as soon as practicable after January
1, 1938." The Commission has encouraged the submission of voluntary plans for com-
pliance under § 11(e). See American Water Works and Electric Co., Inc., 2 S. E. C.
972, 987 (1937).
9. See, e.g., West Penn Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 376, 387 (1939).
10. Securities Corporation General, Holding Company Act Release No. 2301, Sept.
23, 1940; Philadelphia Co., 6 S. E. C. 752 (1940); Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 4
S. E. C. 406 (1939).
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with any outstanding security." The purposes, however, for which excep-
tions may be made are so broad 12 that preferred stock issues have been fre-
quently approved.13 The Commission derives power tinder Section 7(d) (6)
to pass on the terms and conditions of issue or sale, and under Section 7(f)
to attach terms and conditions to its approval.1 4 Despite these powers it
has authorized preferred stock without requiring "at least the modicum of
protection which flows from the right to elect a majority of directors in
case of dividend defaults."'" Since Commissioner Douglas' dissent in the
International Paper and Power case, 1 however, new preferred shares have
uniformly been accorded contingent majority voting rights. Moreover, the
inadequacy of the safeguards afforded by voting rights contingent solely on
dividend defaults 17 has been considered. Foreseeing future pressure bargains
imposed on preferred stockholders through common stock dominance, Com-
missioner Frank in the North American case18 vainly suggested provisions
for shifting control to the senior securities when a special capital surplus is
reduced below some substantial stated amount.10
More recently, however, the terms and conditions of new preferred issues,
although not providing for shifts of control in the election of directors except
in case of dividend defaults, have assumed a consistent pattern in affording
purchasers substantially more voting protection.20 Under the usual provisions,
mergers and consolidations, for example, must be approved by the new pre-
ferred holders voting as a class. 21 Similarly, prejudicial charter amendments
must have the consent of two-thirds of the preferred class.22 But more sig-
11. Community Power and Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182, 194, n. 4 (1939).
12. § 7(c) (2). See Comment (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rav. 1331, 1342.
13. See Security Issues of Electric and Gas Utilities 1935-1940, RFP. oF S. E. C.,
P. U. Div. (1941) 11.
14. For the Commission's interpretation of § 7(d), see Federal Water Service Corp.,
Holding Company Act Release No. 2635, March 24, 1941; Engineers Public Service
Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2535, Feb. 4, 1941. The power to impose condi-
tions under § 7(f) is defended against the charge of intrusion on managerial discretion
in Northeastern Water and Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2314,
Oct. 2, 1940.
15. International Paper and Power Co., 2 S. E. C. 274 (1937), 2 S. E. C. 580, 584
(1937) (Commissioner Douglas dissenting).
16. 2 S. E. C. 580, 584 (1937).
17. For discussion of the need for other contingencies for shifting control to pre-
ferred stockholders see Stevens, supra note 7, 40 Q. J. EcoN. at 388.
18. The North American Co., 4 S. E. C. 434, 462 (1939), 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 744.
19. 4 S. E. C. 434, 490, 494 (1939). See Comment (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1331,
1339.
20. For the influence of Commissioner Frank's views, compare the North American
Co., 4 S. E. C. 434, 462 et seq. (1939) with West Penn Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 376 (1939).
See also Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483, 517, n. 54 (1939).
21. Mergers or consolidations made upon order, approval, or permission of the
Commission are excepted. See, e.g., Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., 5 S. E. C. 418, 424
(1939).
22. Typical provisions making a notable advance in corporate practice are the require-
ments that no new preferred shares may be issued without the consent or over the veto
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nificantly, unless elaborate conditions aimed at preserving a capital cushion
are satisfied, the approval of two-thirds is also required for dividend pay-
ments on outstanding junior shares and for subsequent issues of preferred
stock or debt securities.2 3 Furthermore, in corporate elections they have won
increased recognition through permanent voting rights share-for-share with
the common stock.2 4 After defaults aggregating one year's dividends, more-
over, they may vote as a class for two directors and, after the accumulation
of twelve quarterly dividends, they may elect a majority of the board.2
From this norm the variations, usually involving earlier shifts of control,
have been slight.26 The Commission has expressly admitted its responsibility
for these provisions.2 7  Its satisfaction with them as providing a fair and
equitable distribution of voting power may be inferred from the failure spe-
cifically to reserve the right to redistribute under Section 11(b)(2).
While policing voting rights under other sections of the Act, the Com-
mission has made few direct references to the fair and equitable distribution
required by Section 11(b) (2). From isolated statements of policy it has
indicated that for going concerns with satisfactory security ratios the formula
applied to new issues is adequate. In the early America, Water WVorks case,
of the preferred stockholders unless (a) net earnings available for dividends in the pre-
ceding year have been twice the proposed annual preferred dividend requirement;
(b) gross income has been one and one-half times the sum of interest on funded debt
and long-term notes plus the annual preferred dividend requirement; (c) the aggregate
par value after the issue is less than a stipulated figure and less than twice the sum of
surplus plus capital represented by junior stock. Without similar consent no dividends
may be declared on junior stock unless surplus plus capital represented by the junior
stock exceeds a stipulated figure measured in terms of the annual preferred dividend
requirement, nor may unsecured indebtedness be increased if after the issuance the total
principal amount of unsecured securities would exceed 10 per cent of the total principal
amount of secured debt plus stated capital and surplus. See, e.g., Wisconsin Electric
Power Co., 7 S. E. C. 138, 147 (1940).
23. See, e.g., The Kansas Power and Light Co., 7 S. E. C. 113, 121 (1940) ; South-
western Gas and Electric Co., 6 S. E. C. 806, 811 (1940).
24. In very recent issues the preferred stock's one vote per share has been strength-
ened by a reduction of the common's vote to one-tenth of a vote per share. See The
Ohio Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2660, March 29, 1941; Appalachian
Electric Power Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2430, Dec. 14, 1940.
25. The once prevalent requirement that defaults be consecutive has been sanctioned
in rare instances. See Appalachian Electric Power Co., Holding Company Act Release
No. 2430, Dec. 14, 1940, p. 7; American Gas and Power Co., 3 S. E. C. 911, 926 (1938);
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 41, Mfarch 29, 1941,
p. 20; La France Industries, 5 S. E. C. 917, 923 (1939).
26. See, e.g., Central Ohio Light & Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 651, 662 (1939). Com-
missioner Frank in the North American case declared that twelve quarterly defaults post-
poned the shift of control too long, 4 S. E. C. 434, 490, n. 36, 494 (1939). In reorganiza-
tions the preferred have gained the greatest rights. See Utilities Power & Light Corp.,
5 S. E. C. 483 (1939) (permanent minority representation; two-thirds of the directors
when arrears equal $1.87%).
27. The Narragansett Electric Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2213, Aug. 7,
1940, p. 3.
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moreover, it hinted that higher standards would be followed in the case of
new issues than in a redistribution of voting power among outstanding
securities. 28  Companies with long uninterrupted dividend records and sub-
stantial common stock equities have been excused from conferring permanent
voting rights upon preferred stockholders; in such cases the Commission has
insisted only on more adequate protection in the event of continued dividend
defaults. 29  But indicative of the extent to which a complete realign-
ment of corporate elections may be developed, sterilization of common stock
voting power, giving exclusive voting rights to the preferred, has been em-
phatically urged as a device for divestment of subsidiaries unretainable in
integrated utility systems under Section 11(b) (1).30 In corporations weak-
ened by misdirected use of predominant voting power-3 1 and presently ripe
for reorganization, moreover, drastic redistributions have been threatened.
Preferred stockholders with unpaid dividends accrued will be enfranchised, 2
and in extreme cases of topheavy structures voting rights will be given to
debt securities. 33
Furthermore, the Commission's belated program for enforcing Section
11(b) (2) 34 has been directed at corporations where valueless common stock
constituting only a small percentage of capital stock liability and surplus
controls a large percentage of the voting power. In the first move under
the program, the voting trust dominating the International Hydro-Electric
System has been directed to surrender for cancellation the valueless stock
through which the system was controlled.3 5 In a more recent case, the New
England Public Service Company has been ordered to recapitalize on at
28. American Water Works and Electric Co., Inc., 2, S. E. C. 972, 986 (1937). See
Meck and Cary, supra note 4, at 225.
29. American Water Works and Electric Co., Inc., 2 S. E. C. 972, 986 (1937).
30. Frank in (19,40) 113 ELECTRICAL WORLD 1133. See Comment (1941) 50 YALF
L. J. 1045, 1047; Gay, Managerial Suicide (1940) 25 P. U. FORT. 707.
31. The manner in which control has been used will have an important bearing on the
form of redistribution required. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 4 S. E, C. 406, 414
(1939).
32. See Northern Indiana Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 910, 922 (1940).
33. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 5 S. E. C. 788, 823 (1939).
34. In conjunction with its enforcement of § 11(b)(1) [See Comment (1941) 50
YALE L. J. 1045] the Commission began its program for the administration of § 11(b) (2)
early in 1940. See Electric Bond and Share Co., Holding Company Act Release No. 2051,
May 10, 1940; Standard Power and Light Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2095,
June 7, 1940; International Hydro-Electric System, Holding Company Act Release No.
2122, June 20, 1940; Northern New England Co., Holding Company Act Release No,
2291, Sept. 16, 1940; The United Light and Power Co., Holding Company Act Release
No. 2407, Dec. 6, 1940; The Middle West Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2411,
Dec. 9, 1940.
35. International Hydro-Electric System, Holding Company Act Release No. 2494,
Jan. 17, 1941. For the Commission's antipathy to voting trusts as restrictions on voting
power, see The United Illuminating Trust, Holding Company Act Release No. 2245,
Aug. 20, 1940. Voting trusts, however, have been sanctioned in reorganizations as de-
vices for protecting creditors. See Meck and Cary, supra note 4, at 226-229.
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common stock basis or liquidate on the dual grounds that its structure is
complicated by numerous series of preferred stocks on which tremendous
dividend arrearages have accumulated and that its voting power is controlled
by the common stock.36 By jointly invoking its powers to decree corporate
simplification and voting power redistribution,37 therefore, the Commission
is forcing vulnerable corporations into involuntary reorganization.
While the Commission has thus geared its active administration of Section
11(b)(2) to the reorganization of structurally deficient corporations, its
policy toward voting rights in going concerns with satisfactory corporate
structures has been redefined in a recent opinion.38 Columbia Gas & Elec-
tric Corporation sought to defend a distribution of voting rights in which
preferred stockholders are entitled to vote for directors only when four divi-
dends are in default and then only on a share-for-share basis with the numer-
ically superior common.3 9 The Commission ignored the claim that dividend
records were good 40 and the general contention that enfranchising the pre-
ferred would impair the rights of the common stockholders who had assumed
the risks in return for control.41 Recognizing the inadequacies of cumulative
voting as a substitute for class voting 42 and rejecting the argument that
most of the preferred stock had an effective voice through ownership by
common stockholders,4 3 it refused to find the distribution fair and equitable.
Regardless of existing fortuitous protection," therefore, and aware of the
possibilities that its own jurisdiction over many companies is not perma-
nent,45 the Commission has shown itself resolved to allow no exceptions
to the formula it has devised.
36. Northern New England Co., Holding Company Act Release No. -2737, May 3,
1941.
37. The Commission has also invoked the "great-grandfather" clause (supra note 3)
in the dissolution of the top holding company in the United Light and Power System.
Holding Company Act Release No. 2636, March 20, 1941.
38. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2477, Jan.
10, 1941, pp. 23-24. The application, filed under § 11(e), sought a declaration by the
Commission that the system conformed to the standards of § 11(b). See Comment ( 1941
50 YAiz L. J. 1045, 1050.
39. In the three companies in which the distribution of voting power %%as under
scrutiny, provisions for cumulative voting after the requisite defaults are supplied by
charter or statute.
40. Brief for Applicant, p. 64, Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., Holding Company
Act Release No. 2477, Jan. 10, 1941. The argument was probably inspired by the Aneri-
can Water Works case. See supra note 29.
41. Brief for Applicant, pp. 63, 64.
42. The Commission emphasized the illusory nature of this form of protection where
the common stock is all held by one stockholder. Holding Company Act Release No.
2477, Jan. 10, 1941, p. 24. See Peoples Light and Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 557,560 (1939).
43. Holding Company Act Release No. 2477, Jan. 10, 1941, p. 24, n. 26a.
44. The Commission sanctions deviations from its pattern only in exceptional cases.
See Charles True Adams, Trustee, 7 S. E. C. 36, 53 (1940).
45. See The North American Co., 4 S. E. C. 434, 486 (1939) (Commissioner Frank
dissenting), 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 744; cf. Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C.
483, 517, n. 54 (1939).
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More significant than the implications of the Columbia Gas opinion is the
Commission's affirmative declaration that an effective vote within the meaning
of Section 11(b) (2) must afford preferred stockholders "recognition in the
corporation in an amount substantially corresponding to the proportion of
their investment." 4 The generality of the definition conforms with the
Commission's evident policy in voting rights cases of avoiding the establish-
ment of precedents which might later have to be discarded. It may, in addition,
be designed to serve as a basis for raising the standards as the program for
enforcing Section 11 develops. If the Commission intends to require initial
voting rights for preferred stock on a dollar-for-dollar, rather than a share-
for-share, basis with the common, it can look for authority to the framers
of the statute.47 But so revolutionary a requirement would deny to common
stockholders the control which they traditionally obtain in return for the
risk they assume.48  Moreover, the conditions which the Commission has
admittedly attached to preferred stock suggest that recognition in proportion
to investment will be required only in the event of dividend defaults. With
voting rights initially share-for-share, and contingently dollar-for-dollar, with
the common, the Commission will apparently be satisfied. The result of
the dictum in the Columbia Gas case, therefore, may be merely the accelera-
tion of shifts of control to preferred stock.
Despite such vague threats of progressive action and the increasingly
high standards that the Commission is requiring of preferred stock voting
provisions, its powers are being frugally employed. If effective pro-
tection and participation are to be achieved, a more decisive therapeutic
is needed. Preferred stock, voting as a class, 49 should have permanent
minority representation5 0 not so large as to block action, but assuring con-
sideration of senior interests. On stated contingencies, the representation
46. Holding Company Act Release No. 2477, Jan. 10, 1941, p. 24. See also the Com-
mission's statement that "where there is a substantial preferred stock investment in rela-
tion to the common stock equity, the preferred stockholders should have an effective
voice in the direction of the company's affairs." American Water Works and Electric
Co., Inc., 2 S. E. C. 972, 986 (1937). Cf. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Corporate Reor-
ganization Release No. 41, March 29, 1941, p. 25; Appalachian Electric Power Co., Hold-
ing Company Act Release No. 2430, Dec. 14, 1940, p. 7 (voting rights considered "iin
relation to investment").
47. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 209.
48. For the view that enfranchising outstanding non-voting stock would be a taking
of property without due process, see Hearings before Subconnittee of the Committee
om the Judiciary on S. 10 and S. 3072, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 571.
49. Cumulative voting, a possible device for corporate democratization, would afford
less assurance that the preferred holders could elect their own nominees. See snpra
note 42.
50. Section 18(a) (2) (C) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 requires such a
provision. For a reorganization plan which included permanent minority representa-
tion, see Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483 (1939).
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should be increased to achieve the Commission's standard of recognition in
proportion to investment. The traditional contingency -accumulation of
dividend arrearages - is appropriate for this formula. Its exclusive use,
moreover, has been approved in recent federal legislation. The Investment
Company Act of 1940 requires provision for preferred stockholders to elect
a majority of directors when dividends are unpaid for two years.5 1 Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, demanding fair and equitable distribution of
voting power within a reorganized company, specifies for preferred stock
that the charter include provisions for the election of representative directors
in the event of dividend defaults . 2 But to insure a shift of control before
damage becomes irreparable, other contingencies, such as the failure of earn-
ings or assets to maintain stated levels, should be considered for inclusion.0
Complemented by class voting rights in proposed action materially affecting
their interests, this permanent participation by preferred stockholders would
help to break down their indifference and to prevent repetition of the abuses
to which they have been subjectedY4
The development of class representation in corporate directorates,55 how-
ever, must be checked by consideration of potential impairments of common
stock rights.56 The shift of control must be timed to give common stockholders
an opportunity, commensurate with their assumption of risk, to achieve suc-
cessful management. Adequate judicial and statutory remedies must be
developed to afford them protection after control has passed and to insure
their reinstatement when assets have increased or preferred dividend arrear-
ages have been eliminated.57  The fiduciary duties of directors must be
doctrinally adjusted to arbitrate new legal relations. Since conflicts between
allegiance to constituents and duty to the corporation as a whole would
51. § 18(a) (2) (C). Pun. L. No. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 15 U. S. C. A. § 80a-
18(a) (2) (C) (Supp. 1940).
52. BmRaup=cr Act § 216(12) (a), 52 STAr. 897, 11 U. S. C. § 616 (Supp. 1938).
Differing conspicuously from the wording of § 216(12) (b), § 216(12) (a) fails to specify
that the requirement for preferred stock is not a limitation on the generality of the term
"fair and equitable distribution." For the unanswered questions which the section presents,
see Krotinger, loc. cit. supra note 6.
53. See GaaHAMcx AND DODD, SEcURIrY AxALysis (1934) 221.
54. The Commission recognizes the apathy of public preferred stockholders. A
class vote for a minority on the directorate, therefore, will not justify omission of other
protective devices to preserve the capital cushion and to prevent impairments of preferred
rights. See Northeastern Water and Electric Corp., Holding Company Act Release No.
2314, Oct. 2, 1940, p. 12.
55. A trend toward extensive representation by classes in reorganized corporations
has been observed and approved by Krotinger, supra note 6, at 680. The Commission
recognizes the restraining power of a vocal minority. See Penn Timber Co., 4 S. E. C.
630, 643 (1939).
56. Unrestrained efforts to protect senior interests might lead to an era in which
the common stockholders would be subjected to worse abuses than those inflicted in the
past upon the preferred. See Legis., (1939) 27 Gao. L. J. 1092, 1106.
57. See Tracy, The Problen of Grantibg Votig Rights to Bondholders (1935) 2
U. OF CH. L. REv. 208, 224-226.
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inevitably arise, the priority of the latter must be established, and directors
must be immunized from liability for approving salutary corporate action
involving sacrifices by the class they represent. s In addition, however, to
enforcing responsibility to the corporate entity, the courts must hold the
director as fiduciary for all stockholders.50 The immediate result of expanded
corporate suffrage and class representation, compensating for new difficulties
in balancing the relationships within corporations, would be closer scrutiny
of the conduct of directors and higher standards of trusteeship. 0
The success of a program of redistributing voting power, however, ulti-
mately depends on adequate procedure for the nomination and election of
directors.61 No shift of control, moreover, is possible unless disclosure require-
ments and proxy machinery divorced from domination by the vested man-
agement can be geared to arouse American investors from their traditional
inertia. 62 The objective of the program must be the return of control from
entrenched minorities to the actual owners, newly aroused and educated for
intelligent participation.3 With the powers it derives from the Holding
Company Act to regulate and reform corporate elections, the Commission
can test the potentialities of permanent representation for all security holders.
If the experiments fail to give adequate protection, the need would be proved
for abandoning the existing forms of stockholder participation and for estab-
lishing quasi-public protective committees.6 4
58. Decisions on dividend policies or preferred stock retirements would raise such
problems.
59. See BERLE AND MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERITY
(1932) 226; cf. Federal Water Service Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2635,
March 24, 1941, p. 21.
60. The provisions of the Holding Company Act "afford a starting point from which
the Commission is proceeding to impose new fiduciary responsibilities on the part of
those participating in public utility finance and management." Meck and Cary, supra
note 4, at 237. See The Higbee Co., Corporate Reorganization Release No. 39, March
25, 1941, p. 23.
61. For an example of the Commission's emphasis on procedural adequacy, see
La France Industries, 5 S. E. C. 917, 937 (1939). Section 216(11) of Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act requires that the reorganized company's charter include provisions for
the selection of directors which are equitable, compatible with all interests and consistent
with public policy. Compare § 725 of the Railroad Adjustment Act, 53 STAT. 1138,
11 U. S. C. § 1225 (Supp. 1939). See GRAHAM AND DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934)
223 for a possible procedure.
62. The Commission's able administration of securities legislation has not solved
the problems, possibly insuperable, connected with shareholder participation through
proxies. See Comments (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 492, 508; (1940) 53 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
63. The divorce of control from ownership is probably the fundamental vice in the
modern corporation which the S. E. C. must eliminate. See Drucker, Must a War Econ-
omy be Permanent? (1941) HARPERS 569, 574.
64. "No program can be effective unless the scattered, disorganized, lethargic, and
impotent stockholders have some one to think and act for them." Douglas, Directors
Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1334.
1236 [Vol. 50: 1228
